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COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW YORK
People v. White'
(decided March 20, 2008)
Gary White was convicted of second-degree murder.2 He
later appealed to the Appellate Division, Second Department, claim-
ing that because his statements "were the result of a continuing cus-
todial interrogation that began before the administration of Miranda
warnings" they were involuntary and should be suppressed. 3 The ap-
pellate division affirmed the conviction, but held that since the de-
fendant had not made inculpatory statements until after the Miranda
reading, it was unnecessary to address whether the post-Miranda
statements stemmed from the pre-Miranda investigation. After
granting leave to appeal, the Court of Appeals of New York affirmed,
but directly addressed whether the defendant's statements were "part
of a single continuous chain of events," thereby violating his Fifth
Amendment right against self incrimination, and ultimately held that
they were not.
White was arrested for domestic violence. 6 His girlfriend in-
formed the arresting officer, Officer Conde, that White was also in-
volved in an unsolved murder.7 She divulged who White murdered,
' 886 N.E.2d 156 (N.Y. 2008).
2 Id. at 158.
3 Id.
4 Id. 158-59.
' Id. at 160.
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how he did it, and where it took place.8 After holding White in a cell
for over seventeen hours, Detective Sommer and Detective Byrne had
White brought into an office for questioning. 9 Sommer presented
White with a computer generated picture of Hansen, the victim who
White allegedly shot.' ° When White questioned why he was shown
the picture, Byrne stated " '[the victim] was either killed in cold
blood, or there was a reason for it' " and then asked White if he
would " 'like to tell his side of the story.' "' White responded that
he would explain everything and he was subsequently read his
Miranda rights.' 2 White signed and acknowledged a Miranda rights
card and "indicated he was willing to speak with the detectives.'
3
After the detectives explained "they knew his alibi was fabricated and
that he should tell the truth," White admitted that he murdered the
victim and provided details.' 4 White acquiesced to the detectives' re-
quest for a written statement, however he failed to mention the shoot-
ing. 15 Confronted with the omission, White gave an additional writ-
ten statement where he included shooting the victim. 16 White agreed
to a taped video confession, at which an assistant district attorney




' White, 886 N.E.2d at 157.
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 Id. at 157-58.
"5 Id. at 158.
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tered his Miranda rights, he requested an attorney for the first time.' 8
During a suppression hearing, the defendant argued that his
confession should be suppressed.' 9 He reasoned that the police began
interrogating him prior to reading him his Miranda rights and "there
was no attenuation between the initial interrogation, the subsequent
administration of Miranda rights and the 'Mirandized' statements.,
20
At first, the trial court ruled in favor of the defendant, reasoning that
the post-Miranda statements were tainted by the officer's pre-
Miranda request for defendant's version of the facts and that because
White had been with the same officers who had first accused him, a
"15 to 20 minute break .. was insufficient to purge the taint from
the post-Miranda statements. 21  In addition, the court questioned
whether the defendant's statements were truly voluntary or if they
were a result of depriving the defendant with inadequate food or
bathroom use.22 However, after the People sought to reargue their
case, the trial court held that the defendant's post-Miranda statements
were admissible. 23 Accordingly, White was convicted of second-
degree murder and sentenced to twenty-two years to life.24
The defendant appealed to the Appellate Division, Second




21 White, 886 N.E.2d at 158.
22 Id. (The court stated that the People did not meet "their burden to prove beyond a rea-
sonable doubt" that the defendant had been supplied with adequate food and use of the bath-
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ing were involuntary and should be suppressed. 25  He stated that
"they were the result of a continuing custodial interrogation that be-
gan before the administration of Miranda warnings . . . [because]
they were given without a pronounced break., 26 The appellate divi-
sion affirmed the verdict solely on the fact that all inculparory state-
ments were made after the Miranda warnings were given.27 There-
fore, the court determined that the defendant properly waived his
rights and found it unnecessary to contemplate if there was a break in
21events. 8 Upon defendant's appeal, the New York Court of Appeals
affirmed, concluding that the lower court's logic was flawed and
finding that an inquiry to determine if pre- and post-Miranda state-
ments were part of the same "continuous chain of events" must be
made regardless of whether the pre-Miranda statements were incul-
patory.29 The Court of Appeals held that the pre- and post-Miranda
actions did "not constitute a single continuous chain of events. 3 °
Thus, the defendant's choice to confess was not impaired and allow-
ing the post-Mirandized statements to be entered as evidence would
not offend due process.31
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Pigott declared that under
New York law, White's statement should be suppressed.32 He noted
that the state and federal constitutions afford different levels of pro-
25 Id.
26 White, 886 N.E.2d at 158.
27 Id. at 158-59.
28 Id. at 159.
29 Id.
30 Id. at 160.
31 White, 886 N.E.2d at 160.
32 Id. (Pigott, J., dissenting).
1244 [Vol. 25
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tection in regard to self-incrimination, pointing out that the Fifth
Amendment under the New York Constitution grants more protection
than the Fifth Amendment under the United States Constitution in
cases where consecutive questioning leads to a proper post-
Mirandized statement following an improper un-Mirandized state-
ment.33
In White, the majority noted that although the United States
Supreme Court in Missouri v. Seibert3 4 has stated that" 'the question-
first tactic effectively threatens to thwart Miranda's purpose of re-
ducing the risk that a coerced confession would be admitted,' ,,3 the
question of whether Due Process was offended rested on a condition
discussed in Culombe v. Connecticut,36 which addressed whether "
'the defendant's will [was] overborne and his capacity for self-
determination critically impaired' "when giving the confession.37
In determining whether the defendant's right to due process
was infringed under either the state or federal constitution, it is essen-
tial to first discuss Miranda v Arizona.38 In Miranda, the Supreme
Court addressed whether statements made to officers, by persons in
custody who were not informed of their right to silence were admis-
33 Id. (citing People v. Bethea, 493 N.E.2d 937 (N.Y. 1986) (explaining that although the
New York State Constitution and United States Constitution text is virtually identical in re-
spect to self incrimination, New York has interpreted its constitution to extend broader pro-
tection in the realm of self incrimination)); U.S. CONST. amend. V, states, in pertinent part:
"No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.";
N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6, states, in pertinent part: "No person shall be ... compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself or herself."
14 542 U.S. 600 (2004).
" White, 886 N.E.2d at 160 (quoting Seibert, 542 U.S. at 617).
36 367 U.S. 568 (1961).
"7 White, 886 N.E.2d at 160 (quoting Culombe, 367 U.S. at 602).
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sible. 39 The Court held that when the defendant's statements stem
from a custodial examination, regardless of whether they are inculpa-
tory or not, they may not be used unless he is first warned of his right
to remain silent and has waived his "rights, provided the waiver is
made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently .... The mere fact that
he may have [voluntarily] answered some questions ... does not de-
prive him of the right to refrain from answering any further inquiries
until he has consulted with an attorney and thereafter consents to be
questioned.,
40
Although the officers did not use "overt physical coercion or
patent psychological ploys," by failing to inform the defendants of
their right to silence and/or counsel, they nevertheless deprived the
detainees of their procedural due process by failing to protect the de-
fendants' Fifth Amendment rights.4' The Court reasoned that be-
cause the officers did not take steps to safeguard the defendants' Fifth
Amendment right to refrain from self-incrimination, any statements
obtained were not a result of a "free choice. 42 Therefore, Miranda
holds that "unless and until such warnings and waiver are demon-
strated by the prosecution at trial, no evidence obtained as a result of
interrogation can be used against him. 43 In White, the defendant ex-
tends the issue faced in Miranda, and asks the question: would due
'9 Id. at 444.
40 Id. at 444-45.
41 Id. at 457; U.S. CONST. amend XIV, states, in pertinent part: "[N]or shall any state de-
prive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law ...."; U.S. CONST.
amend. V, states, in pertinent part: "No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case
to be a witness against himself."
42 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 458.
41 Id. at 479.
1246 [Vol. 25
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process allow the admissibility of a statement obtained after Miranda
warnings were given but stemming from an interrogation that began
without them?
In determining if due process had indeed been offended by al-
lowing the defendant's confessions, the majority in White, referred to
the Supreme Court decisions in Seibert and Culombe.44
In Culombe, the Supreme Court addressed when the use of a
defendant's confession violates the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment.45 The Court stated that the well established test
of "voluntariness" remains the threshold question when determining a
constitutional infringement.46  The Court further explained that
'voluntariness' . . .concerns [the] mental state" of the defendant re-
sulting from the psychological factors of each case.47 The psycho-
logical factors are determined by applying the defendant's reactions
to the external facts of the case. 48 "[W]here ... the uncontested ex-
ternal happenings, coercive forces set in motion by state law en-
forcement officials ... are powerful enough to draw forth a confes-
sion," the confession is involuntary.49 In Culombe, an adult with the
mental capacity of a nine-year-old ° was questioned for over four
days regarding his involvement in a murder.51 During this time, the
defendant was not warned of his right to remain silent, denied his re-
44 White, 886 N.E.2d at 160.
45 Culombe, 367 U.S. at 568-69.
46 Id. at 602.
47 Id. at 603.
48 Id. at 604.
49 Id. at 605.
50 Culombe, 367 U.S. at 605.
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quest for an attorney, interrogated with his wife and sick child pre-
sent, and subjected to intimidation. 52  When the defendant finally
signed a confession it was "clear that ...[his] will was broken.
53
The Court held that his confession was involuntary and if used
against him would be a violation of due process.54
In Seibert, before administering Miranda rights, police inter-
rogated the defendant regarding her involvement in a murder.55 After
repeatedly denying the accusations, the officers finally elicited a con-
fession.56 Then, the officers read the defendant her Miranda rights
and asked her to repeat the confession she had just given.57 The
United States Supreme Court, in a plurality decision, held that the
confessions were inadmissible because they originated from a co-
erced and un-Mirandized statement.5 8 Although the Court disagreed
on whether the intent of the officers should be considered, they did
agree that the central question in determining if Mirandized state-
ments are admissible is whether the questioned person had a real
choice in agreeing to give the statement.59 The Court held that the
defendant did not, reasoning that although she was read Miranda
rights it was involuntary because the admission occurred only after
exhaustive interrogation. 60 Furthermore, not only did the same offi-
cer question her pre- and post-Miranda, but he referred back to the
52 See id. at 630-34.
13 Id. at 634.
14 Id. at 635.
15 Seibert, 542 U.S. at 604-05.
56 Id. at 605.
57 Id.
58 Id. at 606.
'9 Id. at 611-12.
60 Seibert, 542 U.S. at 616.
1248 [Vol. 25
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prior statement she had given.61 It would not appear to a reasonable
person that the accused could change her statement. 62 In fact, the of-
ficers had been trained to use this "question-first" technique because
it was likely to procure a post-Miranda admission.63
In contrast to Seibert, the Supreme Court in Oregon v. El-
stad 64 concluded that due process is satisfied when Miranda warnings
are given to a suspect, even if they are given after an un-Mirandized
voluntary confession. 65 The Court reasoned that Miranda warnings
give the suspect the choice to refrain from speaking.66 Therefore, if a
suspect makes a choice to speak, he is acting on his own "free will,"
and any conditions which prevented the admissibility of the un-
warned statements are removed.67
In Elstad, two police officers went to the home of a teenage
boy with a warrant for his arrest in connection with a neighborhood
robbery.68 While one officer was in the kitchen explaining the situa-
tion to his mother, the other officer questioned the defendant about
his involvement, to which Michael replied, " '[y]es, I was there.' ,69
When the officers brought the defendant to the station house they
read him his Miranda rights, which he waived, and then he gave an
admission." However, the defendant later moved to suppress his
61 Id. at 616-17.
62 Id. at616-18.
63 Id. at 609.
64 470 U.S. 298 (1985).
65 Id. at 310-11.
66 Id.
67 Id.
68 Elstad, 470 U.S. at 300-01.
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statements on the theory that his post-Mirandized statements were in-
voluntary.71 He reasoned that he had " ' let the cat out of the bag' "
when the officer questioned him at his house, therefore, he felt he had
no choice but to later admit to the robbery. The Court concluded
that "[t]he relevant inquiry [was] whether, in fact, the second state-
ment was also voluntarily made. 73 The Court determined that the
second statement was voluntary because it followed a "voluntary and
knowing waiver., 74 The Court held that a suspect, who has previ-
ously answered uncoercive questioning, without being read his
Miranda rights, is not later barred from waiving his rights and con-
fessing after Miranda rights have been properly administered.75
The Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause requires that
the guarantee of justice and liberty, which it provides, is extended to
criminal proceedings.76 In Lyons v. Oklahoma, the Supreme Court
stated that the key to admissibility of a statement is whether it is vol-
untary.77 The Court reasoned that if a "confession was the unavoid-
able outgrowth" of coercion it would be inadmissible.78 However, if
"evidence would justify a determination that the effect of a prior co-
ercion was dissipated before the second confession" it would be con-
sidered voluntary and would not be repugnant to due process.79
Similarly, the New York Court of Appeals has also noted the
7" Id. at 302-03.
72 Id. (citing United States v. Bayer, 331 U.S. 532 (1947)).
73 Elstad, 470 U.S. at 318.
74 id.
71 ld. at 318.
76 Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U.S. 596, 601 (1944).
77 Id. at 603.
78 id.
79 Id. at 604.
1250 [Vol. 25
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importance of a voluntary confession. In People v. Anderson,80 the
court stated that "it has come to be accepted that the requirement for
voluntariness of confessions, though heavily influenced by the privi-
lege against self incrimination, is essentially a matter of due proc-
ess."8' In Anderson, a twenty-one-year-old suspect was arrested
without cause and held for nineteen hours without food or sleep.
82
After continual interrogation with access to no one other than police
officers, he succumbed to their demand for a confession.83 The court
held that the confession was involuntary, and therefore offended due
process.
84
However, a defendant who first declines to answer questions
when interrogated in violation of Miranda can change his mind and
then give an admissible statement. In People v. Kinnard,85 the sus-
pect did just that.86 The Court of Appeals again looked to voluntari-
ness and held that when a suspect, after refusing to speak, changes his
mind spontaneously without provocation, the statement is admissi-
ble.87
In People v. Paulman,88 the Court of Appeals addressed
"whether two statements defendant made after he was given Miranda
warnings and waived his right to remain silent should have been sup-
80 364 N.E.2d 1318 (N.Y. 1977).
81 Id. at 1319 (citing Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964)).
82 Id.
83 Id. at 1320.
84 Anderson, 364 N.E.2d at 1322.
" 467 N.E.2d 886 (N.Y. 1984).
86 Id. at 887.
87 id.
88 833 N.E.2d 239 (N.Y. 2005).
11
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pressed due to the prior, unwamed statement., 89 The court held that
the post-Miranda statements "were properly received as evidence." 90
In Paulman, officers investigated an allegation that the defen-
dant sexually abused a four-year-old girl.9' At the onset of the inves-
tigation, the defendant told the officers that while the girl was nude
he "accidentally" touched her private area while tickling her, and also
rubbed his penis against her while in bed.92 In addition, he informed
the officers that he had sexual intercourse with a thirteen-year-old girl
who resided in his complex.93 The defendant agreed to accompany
the officers to the station for more questioning.94
Upon arriving at the barracks, Trooper Oliver instructed the
defendant to wait for Investigator Christopher Baldwin, and in the
meantime he advised the defendant to take notes regarding his " 'best
recollection of what ... happened.' "95 After the defendant finished
writing his statement, he was read his Miranda rights by Investigator
Baldwin.96 The defendant waived his rights, and then not only "made
a series of oral admissions," but also signed a Miranda waiver and
"initialed each page ... [of the] question-and-answer statement" that
Baldwin had typed up. 97
Prior to trial, the defendant argued that all four of his state-








97 Id. at 241-42.
1252 [Vol. 25
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ments should be suppressed.98 He reasoned that his oral and hand-
written statements were not preceded by Miranda warnings. In addi-
tion, although the oral statement to Baldwin and the signed typewrit-
ten statement followed Miranda warnings, they should both be
suppressed because they were "tainted by the prior, unwarned custo-
dial interrogation." 99
The suppression court rejected the defendant's argument and
at trial all evidence was admitted, resulting in a conviction.100 The
Appellate Division, Fourth Department, affirmed, holding that only
the handwritten statement should have been suppressed, but that it re-
sulted in no more than harmless error.'0 1 The defendant appealed to
the Court of Appeals, stating that his initial comments should be sup-
pressed, and contending that the other three statements were a result
of the police failing to read his Miranda rights before eliciting the
handwritten statement, and should therefore be suppressed. 10 2 The
Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the statements the defendant
made after receiving Miranda warnings did not result as part of the
same chain of events resulting from the un-Mirandized handwritten
statement. 0 3  In Paulman, the defendant's first admissions were
purely voluntary. His due process rights were not affected because
the defendant was not in custody at the time of his first admission,
therefore, no process was due prior to the admission.
98 Paulman, 833 N.E.2d at 242.
99 Id.
1oo Id.
... Id. at 243.
102 Id. at 242.
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In Paulman, the court relied heavily on its earlier decision in
People v. Chapple,'0 4 which held that that when an admission is made
after Miranda warnings are given, but are still part of the same "sin-
gle continuous chain of events" that began with an un-Mirandized in-
terrogation, it is "inadmissible because it is not truly voluntary." 10 5
The post-Mirandized statement will only be admissible if "there is
such a definite, pronounced break in the interrogation that the defen-
dant may be said to have returned, in effect, to the status of one who
is not under the influence of questioning.
' 0 6
The New York rule outlined in Chapple became even more
clearly articulated in People v. Bethea,'0 7 where the Court of Appeals
clarified that when "the close sequence between the unwarned custo-
dial statement" and the statement following the Miranda warnings,
the second statement must be suppressed. 0 8 In Bethea, police offi-
cers stopped two suspects and began to question them without read-
ing the Miranda warnings. 0 9 After obtaining a statement, the offi-
cers brought the suspect to the precinct where the suspect repeated
the statement following the administration of the Miranda warn-
ings.110
In Bethea, the court noted the differences between the warn-
ings required by the New York Constitution as described in Chapple,
and the warnings required by the United States Constitution as read
'04 341 N.E.2d 243 (N.Y. 1975).
'o' Id. at 245.
106 Id. at 245-46.
107 493 N.E.2d 937 (N.Y. 1986).
108 Id. at 939.
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in Elstad.'11 The court clarified that "as a matter of State constitu-
tional law," Chapple must be followed.
12
After comparing both the U.S. Constitution and the New York
Constitution, it is apparent that New York guarantees a higher level
of protection to ensure that the defendant's decision to incriminate
himself is truly voluntary. New York ensures this by demanding that
post-Mirandized statements are only admissible if there is a pro-
nounced break between the un-Mirandized interrogation and the post-
Mirandized statement. The approach under the Federal Constitution
is more relaxed, allowing any statements following an un-Mirandized
interrogation to be admissible by reading the Miranda rights, so long
as there was no coercion involved in making the statement. As
Paulman stated, the New York Court of Appeals was so adamant in
this distinction, that they wrote the decision in Bethea to ensure that
more was required under the New York Constitution than Elstad re-
quired.1 13 In other words, the court wanted to clarify that merely ut-
tering warnings "would [not] be sufficient to justify the admission of
subsequent statements."' 14 For a Miranda warning to satisfy due
process in New York, there must be adequate assurance that the de-
fendant was effectively warned of his right against self incrimination
and if the pre-interrogation and post-Miranda statements are part of
the same "single continuous chain of events," then the assurance is
inadequate. 1 5 Although the wording of both constitutions is practi-
... Id. at 939.
112 Bethea, 493 N.E.2d 937 at 939.
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cally indistinguishable, New York has interpreted its Due Process
Clause to require that Miranda rights be given at the onset of an in-
vestigation.' 16 Only if there is a pronounced break before the Miran-
dized statement is made can it be admissible in New York." 7 So the
question becomes when is there a "single continuous chain of
events?"
Until White, this question seemed to be answered by consider-
ing the list of factors annunciated in Paulman.1 8 The factors in-
cluded: the lapse in time between the occurrence of the Miranda vio-
lation and the admission which followed; the presence of police
personnel when the statement was taken; whether there was a change
of venue during the interrogation; the circumstances, such as the
level, to which, the interrogation was unacceptable; and whether the
defendant was willing to offer information to police before the
Miranda violation.1 9 Although "[n]o one factor is determinative,...
• [t]he purpose of the inquiry is to assess whether there was a suffi-
ciently 'definite, pronounced break in the interrogation' to dissipate
the taint from the Miranda violation."'
' 20
The problem with the factors listed in Paulman is that when
applied, results can vary drastically. In fact, the analysis in White il-
luminates the shortcomings of the application. The majority applied
the factors enunciated in Paulman and held that the circumstances of
the present case did not comprise "a single continuous chain of
116 id.
117 Id.
"' White, 886 N.E.2d at 159.
119 Id. (citing Paulman, 833 N.E.2d at 245).
120 Paulman, 833 N.E.2d at 245 (citing Chapple, 341 N.E.2d 243).
1256 [Vol. 25
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events." 12 1 In sharp contrast, the dissent applied the same factors
from Paulman and concluded that the events were not separated by a
pronounced break and, therefore, deemed the defendant was entitled
to suppress his post-Miranda statements.
122
The blurry line articulated in Chapple, that a defendant is ex-
ercising his free choice if he "may be said to have returned, in effect,
to the status of one who is not under the influence of questioning,"'
123
seems to have left the courts to decipher its meaning without any
clear guidelines. It is hard to say whether the Bethea Court suc-
ceeded in expanding the Due Process Clause protection beyond what
was afforded in Elstad. In fact, depending on the justice presiding,
the mere utterance of Miranda warnings may still be enough to cure a
New York pre-Miranda violation.
The Paulman factors should be read broadly when determin-
ing whether a break in an interrogation is sufficient to cure a proper
un-Mirandized investigation followed by a Mirandized admission.
Unless the application of the factors support a conclusion that the de-
fendant only gave his confession because his will was overborne, it
should be deemed admissible. At the heart of this constitutional
struggle is finding a balance between protecting a defendant from an
unfair prosecution and ensuring that justice prevails. As the number
of necessary procedural safeguards against self incrimination contin-
ues to increase, so does the defendant's chances of escaping punish-
ment due to a technicality. Therefore, as long as the safeguards
"' See White, 886 N.E.2d at 159-60.
122 Id. at 161-62 (Pigott, J., dissenting).
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given, such as Miranda warnings, were effective in allowing a defen-
dant to make a voluntary decision to confess, he should not later be
able to escape punishment based on a technicality, as the defendant in
White tried to do. In White, the majority correctly decided that the
break was sufficient to cure the Miranda violation, since an applica-
tion of the Paulman factors did not indicate that the defendant's will
was overborne. 124 Applying the Paulman factors narrowly, as Justice
Pigott's dissent suggests, would result in defendants having an over-
abundant amount of room to argue the technicalities of their admis-
sions. Hence, following the dissent's analysis would hinder justice,
since more voluntary confessions would likely be suppressed. 1
25
Rosalinde Casalini
124 White, 886 N.E.2d at 160.
125 White, 886 N.E.2d at 160; Thomas P. Windom, Note, The Writing On The Wall:
Miranda's "Prior Criminal Experience Exception, " 92 VA. L. REV. 327, 361-63 (2006) (stat-
ing that by excluding a defendant's admission, that was voluntarily made when his will was
not overborne, merely because of a technicality is against public policy. Such evidence
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DOUBLE JEOPARDY
United States Constitution Amendment V:
[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put
in jeopardy of life or limb ....
New York Constitution article I, section 6:
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